C-104/10 Kelly: it is not there, yet it might be there

I think you are guilty of discrimination and I think you should prove it...

Background

Mr Kelly was refused his application to be admitted to a course entitled ‘Master’s degree in Social Science (Social Worker) mode A’. He screamed discrimination, claiming that he was better qualified than the least-qualified female candidate to be offered a place. In this context, Mr Kelly requested copies of the retained applications, copies of the documents appended to or included with those applications, and copies of the ‘scoring sheets’ of the candidates whose application forms had been retained.

The question was: does Mr Kelly a right of access to those documents?

The judgment

The referring court identified three possible sources of the right:
- Art. 4 of Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions,
- Article 1(3) of Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 amending Directive 76/207,
- Article 4(1) of Council Directive 97/80/EC of 15 December 1997 on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on sex.

The Court did not find the right in any of the three pieces of legislation, but added that "it cannot be ruled out that a refusal of disclosure by the defendant, in the context of establishing such facts, could risk compromising the achievement of the objective pursued by that directive and thus depriving Article 4(1) thereof (Council Directive 97/80/EC)  in particular of its effectiveness. It is for the national court to ascertain whether that is the case in the main proceedings".

Art. 4(1) of Council Directive 97/80/EC reads as follows: "Member States shall take such measures as are necessary, in accordance with their national judicial systems, to ensure that, when persons who consider themselves wronged because the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them establish, before a court or other competent authority, facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination, it shall be for the respondent to prove that there has been no breach of the principle of equal treatment."

The following three paragraphs in the judgment are crucial in this regard.

35 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that Member States may not apply rules which are liable to jeopardise the achievement of the objectives pursued by a directive and, therefore, deprive it of its effectiveness (see Case C‑61/11 PPU El Dridi [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 55).
36 According to the wording of the second and third subparagraphs respectively of Article 4(3) TEU, the Member States inter alia ‘shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union’ and ‘shall … refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives’, including those pursued by directives (see El Dridi, paragraph 56).
37 In the present case, it is, however, apparent from the decision for reference that, although the President of the Circuit Court refused the disclosure application, UCD offered to provide Mr Kelly with part of the information requested, which he does not dispute.

 

 

As for Art. 4 of Council Directive 76/207/EEC and Art. 1(3) of Directive 2002/73/EC, the Court reffered to the Member States' freedom of choice instead and found nothing similar to what the Court found above.

46 Those provisions seek to implement the application of the principle of equal treatment as regards access to training but, in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU, leave it, as to form and methods, to the national authorities to take the necessary measures to ensure that ‘any laws, regulations and administrative provisions’ contrary to that principle are abolished.
47 Thus, it is not possible to derive from those provisions a specific obligation to grant an applicant for vocational training access to information concerning the qualifications of other applicants for that course.

In any case, if there is a right of access to documents, there are obviously limits on that right:

55 In assessing such facts, national courts or other competent bodies must take into account the rules governing confidentiality which follow from European Union legal acts, such as Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ 1995 L 281, p. 31) and Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) (OJ 2002 L 201, p. 37), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 (OJ 2009 L 337, p. 11). The protection of personal data is also provided for in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

C-457/09 Chartry: I can't tell you, but the answer is NO

In Chartry, the Court was faced with a potentially interesting question: is it okay for the national legal order, in the first place, to oblige the national courts, if faced with an issue of constitutionality, to always refer the question first to the national Constitutional Court, inluding where the issue also raises an issue of compatibility with the EU law, and, in the second place, to request the national courts to respect the decision of the Constitutional Court.

Well ...

The problem was that the case in the background of this preliminary reference had otherwise no EU-law element whatsoever. Paragraph 25 of the order: "... Le litige au principal, qui oppose un ressortissant belge à l’État belge à propos de la taxation d’activités exercées sur le territoire de cet État membre, ne présente aucun élément de rattachement à l’une quelconque des situations envisagées par les dispositions du traité relatives à la libre circulation des personnes, des services ou des capitaux. En outre, ledit litige ne porte pas sur l’application de mesures nationales par lesquelles l’État membre concerné mettrait en œuvre le droit de l’Union.".

The Court therefore declared itself incompetent to answer the preliminary questions submitted by the referring court. This conclusion is further elaborated in paragraphs 21 to 25:

21 ... il convient de rappeler également que, saisie au titre de l’article 234 CE, la Cour est compétente pour statuer sur l’interprétation du traité CE ainsi que sur la validité et l’interprétation des actes pris par les institutions de l’Union européenne. Dans ce cadre, la compétence de la Cour est limitée à l’examen des seules dispositions du droit de l’Union (voir, notamment, ordonnances du 16 janvier 2008, Polier, C‑361/07, point 9, ainsi que du 12 novembre 2010, Asparuhov Estov e.a., C‑339/10, non encore publiée au Recueil, point 11).

22 S’agissant des exigences découlant de la protection des droits fondamentaux, il est de jurisprudence constante qu’elles lient les États membres dans tous les cas où ils sont appelés à appliquer le droit de l’Union (voir ordonnance Asparuhov Estov e.a., précitée, point 13).

23 De même, l’article 51, paragraphe 1, de la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne (ci-après la «charte») énonce que les dispositions de celle-ci s’adressent «aux États membres uniquement lorsqu’ils mettent en œuvre le droit de l’Union».

24 Au demeurant, cette limitation n’a pas été modifiée par l’entrée en vigueur, le 1er décembre 2009, du traité de Lisbonne, depuis laquelle, en vertu du nouvel article 6, paragraphe 1, UE, la charte a la même valeur juridique que les traités. Cet article précise en effet que les dispositions de la charte n’étendent en aucune manière les compétences de l’Union telles que définies dans les traités.

25 Or, si le droit à un recours effectif, garanti par l’article 6, paragraphe 1, de la CEDH, auquel se réfère la juridiction de renvoi, constitue un principe général du droit de l’Union (voir, notamment, arrêt du 16 juillet 2009, Der Grüne Punkt – Duales System Deutschland/Commission, C‑385/07 P, Rec. p. I‑6155, points 177 et 178) et a été réaffirmé à l’article 47 de la charte, il n’en demeure pas moins que la décision de renvoi ne contient aucun élément concret permettant de considérer que l’objet du litige au principal présente un rattachement au droit de l’Union.

... no, it is not okay

The above-mentioned, however, did not stop the Court from expressing its clear opinion on the issue despite its lack of competence. The Court said:

19 ... il convient de rappeler que, selon une jurisprudence constante de la Cour, afin d’assurer la primauté du droit de l’Union, le fonctionnement du système de coopération entre la Cour de justice et les juridictions nationales instauré par l’article 234 CE nécessite que le juge national soit libre de saisir, à tout moment de la procédure qu’il juge approprié, la Cour de justice de toute question qu’il juge nécessaire (voir arrêt du 22 juin 2010, Melki et Abdeli, C‑188/10 et C‑189/10, non encore publié au Recueil, point 52).

20 Plus particulièrement, la Cour a jugé que l’article 234 CE s’oppose à une législation d’un État membre qui instaure une procédure incidente de contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois nationales, pour autant que le caractère prioritaire de cette procédure a pour conséquence d’empêcher, tant avant la transmission d’une question de constitutionnalité à la juridiction nationale chargée d’exercer le contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois que, le cas échéant, après la décision de cette juridiction sur ladite question, toutes les autres juridictions nationales d’exercer leur faculté ou de satisfaire à leur obligation de saisir la Cour de questions préjudicielles (arrêt Melki et Abdeli, précité, point 57).

In sum, the French legislation at issue is not okay.

By the way

There is one curious element in the decision of the Court. It may not be important, but who knows...

In paragraphs 22 and 23 of the order, the limitation on the applicability of the EU rules on the protection of fundamental rights is defined using two different words. In paragraph 22: "lient les États membres dans tous les cas où ils sont appelés à appliquer le droit de l’Union". In paragraph 23: "s’adressent «aux États membres uniquement lorsqu’ils mettent en œuvre le droit de l’Union»". There is a similar discrepancy in other language versions (German: "Bei der Anwendung des Unionsrechts" x "bei der Durchführung des Rechts der Union", Italian: "in tutti i casi in cui sono chiamati ad applicare il diritto dell’Unione" x "si rivolgono «agli Stati membri esclusivamente nell’attuazione del diritto dell’Unione».").

Two different words, yet the same meaning? Hopefully... (After all, other language versions make use of the same term in both cases; Swedish: "när de tillämpar unionsrätten" x "när dessa tillämpar unionsrätten", Spanish: "en todos los casos en que deben aplicar el Derecho de la Unión" x "dirigidas «a los Estados miembros únicamente cuando apliquen el Derecho de la Unión»", Polish: "gdy stosują one prawo Unii" x "w zakresie, w jakim stosują one prawo Unii".)

C-399/09 Landtova: Peace?

The much-awaited judgment (at least in the Czech Republic) in the Landtova case is out, but surprisingly, things have been rather quiet this far. And peaceful...

Background
When Czechoslovakia fell apart by the end of 1992 and was succeeded by the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the two countries decided (in a bilateral agreement) to take account of the "federation time" for the purposed of counting the pension in the following way: where, by the end of 1992, a person worked for an employer based in the Czech Republic, the "federation time" was deemed to be "Czech time" and vice versa. Landtova is a Czech national who, by the end of 1992, worked for an employer based in Slovakia, meaning that her "federation time" is considered to be "Slovak time". As a result, her pension is lower than it would have been if she had benefited from the "Czech time".

When faced with applicants like Landtova, the Constitutional Court ruled that this was contrary to the Constitution (the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, to be more precise) and required that such applicants should be treated as if they worked for an employer based in the Czech Republic by the end of 1992, and there pensions should accordingly be increased to the appropriate level (so that the Czechs with Slovak-based employers are not discriminated against as opposed to the Czechs with Czech-based employers).
The Supreme Administrative Court repeatedly disagreed with the Constitutional Court and, finally, sent the case to Luxembourg, taking the view that the rule "created" by the Counstitutional Court runs counter to Regulation no 1408/71 and to the ban on discrimination.

Judgment
The Court ruled just as it was advised to rule by GA Cruz Villalón in his opinion of 3 March 2011. In fact, the Court did so pretty much in a "copy and paste" fashion. In short, the Court said:
a) the supplementary benefit introduced by the Czech Republic's Constitutional Court is not contrary to Regulation No 1408/71, because "what is at issue is not the award of a parallel Czech old age benefit, nor one and the same period of insurance being taken into account twice, but merely the elimination of an objectively established difference between benefits from different sources" (paragraph 38 of the judgment);
b) the conditions for acquiring the supplementary benefit (Czech nationality, residence in the Czech republic) are discriminatory and precluded as such by the combined provisions of Article 3(1) and Article 10 of Regulation No 1408/71.
Like the Advocate-General, the Court adds in this regard that "where discrimination contrary to EU law has been established, as long as measures reinstating equal treatment have not been adopted, observance of the principle of equality can be ensured only by granting to persons within the disadvantaged category the same advantages as those enjoyed by persons within the favoured category, the latter arrangements, for want of the correct application of EU law, being the only valid point of reference remaining" (paragraph 51 of the judgment). As far as Ms Landtová is concerned, she belongs to the person within the advantaged category and the Court held in this regard that "there is no provision of EU law which requires that a category of persons who already benefit from supplementary social protection, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, should be deprived of it" (paragraph 53 of the judgment). In other words, the referring court cannot rely on the EU law to deprive Ms Landtová of the supplementary benefit and therefore - in the absence of any other ground capable of overriding the force of the Constitutional Court's case-law - the referring court must give it to her, as required by the case-law of the Constitutional Court.

Follow-up

The good news is that, as a result, a So Lange clash between the Luxembourg Court and the Czech Republic's Constitutional Court will most probably be avoided. Landtová (and other people in her situation) will (most certainly) be given her supplementary benefit and, consequently, the case will never reach the Constitutional Court. Its case-law, though declared discriminatory by the Court in Luxembourg, may thus last forever....
The bad news is that the Court's ruling is the worst result the Czech government could get. What the Court says is: you can provide people with the supplementary benefit, but if you do, you have to give it not only to Czech nationals (residing in the Czech Republic) but to any national of any Member State (including Slovakia). In theory, this could have dramatic consequences for the state budget of the Czech Republic (but it depends on how many nationals of other Member States actually are in the situation such as to be affected by the rule - for one thing, they must have worked in former Czechoslovakia - and on how many of them will actually request the supplementary benefit).
The winner is...